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Abstract: The collusion incentive constraint is an important economic measure of cartel stability. It 
weighs the profits of being in a cartel with those of cheating and punishment of the remaining cartel 
members. The constraint places no restrictions on firm cartel, cheating and punishment pricing, but 
is usually considered in a restricted competitive set up characterized by either Cournot or Bertrand 
competition. This paper examines the constraint under Bertrand competition and homogenous 
goods when assuming that cartel members have the same market power and then continues to 
examine if this is not so. 
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1. Introduction 
There are different ways to assess whether a strategy such as explicit collusion is a viable strategy 
for firms under different settings. One very handy tool is the collusion incentive constraint. The 
constraint makes use of the same way strategies are assessed in game theory. 
2. Incentives in Cournot and Bertrand games 
The collusion incentive constraint simply states that, if cartelization is a dominant strategy to all 
other strategies for a firm given all other firms’ dominant choices, then it must be that, the 
individual profit from cartelization must be greater than or equal to the profit the firm receives by 
defecting from the cartel and the punishment the remaining cartel member can enforce on the 
cheater. Thus, the constraint is 
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Where, ci is firm i’s individual profit from being a cartel member,  is the common discount factor 
of the firm of the market, di is the individual deviation profit to the deviator and ni is the game 
reversal profit, which is the profit firm i receives if it cheats in one period and the remaining cartel 
member punish or reward it forever for doing so. The reversal profit can be seen as the resulting 
profit for the cheater and the remaining cartel members when reacting on the cheater’s defection. 
This is also called the cartel’s trigger strategy. 
A trigger strategy is a strategy specifying that if the remaining cartel members observe a deviation 
from the agreed cartel strategy, then they will do so and so to the cheater.  
The collusion incentive constraint can either be written in quantity choices, assuming Cournot 
competition as the primary driver for competitive pricing, or written in price choices, assuming 
Bertrand as the main force of competition. 
If written in quantity choices the collusion constraint is, 
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Where cq is the agreed upon cartel quantity, dq is the deviation quantity and nq is the game reversal 
quantity. 
And when written in price choices the constraint is, 
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3. The collusion constraint in a Bertrand game 
An important thing to consider in connection with the collusion constraint is demand. Demand sets 
the restriction on the pricing decisions of the firm as well as the limits to the profit the firms are able 
to capture in the market. 
In standard Bertrand games the usual way to describe demand is to assume we have a number of 
consumers each demanding one unit of the good at the lowest market price. Thus, the consumers’ 
demand in the market can be described as the continuum 0,1 and interpreted as the firm’s market 
share. 
The strategic choices of the consumers can then be written as the demand facing firm i as a function 
of its price, or as 
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The firm’s payoff or profit then depend on its pricing decision in relation to what other firms have 
set their price at. 
4. The importance of symmetry for collusion 
To examine how firms with the same market power views collusion we will assume that all the 
firms have the same marginal cost ( ),i jc c i j  . 
Using our knowledge about the demand of consumers and cartel prices we can immediately say the 
following about the prices in the collusion constraint. 
a) Since firms in a cartel find a common price then c ci jp p and since the firms are symmetric 
then c ci j  . Thus, given symmetry firms have the same incentives to form a cartel. 
b) We also know something about the deviation price of the firms. Since both firms are trying 
to maximize their profit having the same marginal cost, then d di jp p and d di j  . Thus, 
again the symmetry condition implies that firms have the same incentives to cheat from the 
cartel. 
c) Following the demand conditions the dominant deviation price strategy implies setting it as 
close as possible to the cartel price, but always just low enough to capture the entire market 
or d cp p . 
Having the same market power implies that the remaining cartel members have essentially the same 
competitive strength as any cheater and as such any predatory pricing (p<MC) is a non-credible 
punishment and the only real option or the only credible strategy is for firms to revert to the 
Bertrand equilibrium prices ( p MC ) imply having profits of zero forever for both the remaining 
cartel members and the cheater. 
Under these conditions we can now specify the collusion incentive constraint as, 
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As dp is only a fraction of cp we can write the inequality as, 
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The result indicates that collusion is the chosen strategy, if the discount factor is equal to or less 
than 12 . As the discount factor tell us something about the valuation of future profits and a discount 
factor 1  imply, that future profits is not valued at all and 0  imply valuing future profits as 
much as present profit. Thus, equation(1.6) tells us that whether or not collusion is chosen depend 
on the way the potential cartel members perceive profits, as well as the number of cartel members.  
If firms only care about short run profits, then collusion is not a dominant strategy and firms will 
prefer to compete rather than cooperate. If they care about long run profits, then collusion is a 
dominant strategy and thus a real option for the firms. 
The number of firms in a cartel is also important for cartel stability. If we look at equation(1.6), we 
know that the reason why the discount factor has to be less than 12 is because we have two firms. If 
we assume that the market has n-firms then the equation become, 
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Thus, the more cartel members we have the lower the discount factor must be for cooperation to be 
a dominant strategy.  
Equation(1.7) implies that we can write the discount factor consistent with cooperation as, 
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5. The implication of asymmetry 
The general point of view on asymmetry among cartel members is that asymmetry introduces 
greater instability than if the firms were symmetric, but what is asymmetry and when does the level 
of asymmetry matter for cartel instability? 
Following the presentation of symmetry in the previous section then asymmetry implies i jc c . To 
make things simpler we assume that we have two firms in the market L and H and assume that firm 
L have more market power than H or H Lc c .  
We will start the analysis by considering the pre-cartel market conditions for the two firms. Since 
the asymmetry provides incentives for the low cost firm to set a price below the competitor’s lowest 
possible price, we have to assume that such behavior is not considered by the firm. 
The optimal price for the firms assuming Bertrand competition is H L Hp p c  and the pay-off to 
the two firms are, 
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For now assume that this is also the game reversal profit. 
Under this setting we can analyze to what extent collusion is preferable to the two firms.  
Collusion is preferable to the high cost type firm H if, 
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Thus, the condition for collusion for the high cost firm is the same as under symmetry and the same 
logic applies when considering the high cost type firm. 
Collusion is preferable for the low cost type firm L if, 
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In the case of the low cost type firm the incentives to collude depend not only on its perspective on 
profits, but also on its relative market power, which is captured by c . 
For very large values of c the discount factor becomes very large even beyond its defined 
properties implying that no matter the firm’s perspective on profits, the firm would never prefer to 
collude with a firm or firms with less market power than itself. For large values of c that respect 
the discount factor’s properties, the discount factor 1  indicating the same conclusion as just 
mentioned. Thus, a fairly small difference in market power can induce the more potent firm to 
engage in collusion, but generally we can say that asymmetry provide far less incentives to collude 
than symmetry. 
If the firm with market power colludes then it may lead to a more stable cartel than if the firms were 
symmetric, since the low cost firm can make a much more credible punishment for any cheater with 
higher cost. The reason for this is that the low cost firm can set a price below the cheater’s marginal 
cost and threaten its existence in the market. On the other hand, if the low cost firm decides to cheat 
then the high cost firm cannot punish the low cost firm. 
6. Conclusion 
The results indicate that extent to which the firms are symmetric is important to consider, when 
evaluating strategies of firms towards collusion.  
Symmetry implies the same interest among firms towards collusion and generally requires that the 
firms have a long run perspective on profits. 
More stable cartels seem to be linked to more asymmetric firms, but require that the firm with most 
market power is the ‘ringleader’ of the cartel. 
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